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WELLENAMP V. BANK OF AMERICA: THE END OF
THE DUE-ON-SALE CLAUSE IN CALIFORNIA
REAL ESTATE FINANCING
ARRANGEMENTS?
I. INTRODUCTION
A "due-on" clause is used in real property security transactions to
allow a lender to declare a loan immediately due and payable upon
transfer or encumbrance' of the subject property.2 Such clauses
emerged during the financial collapse of the Great Depression.3 At
that time, the due-on clause was used primarily to assure the lender
that the loan would only be assumed by a creditworthy buyer.4
In the mid-1960's, lenders' use of the due-on clause changed dra-
matically. As a result of a rapid increase in interest rates, lenders used
the due-on clause to raise loan portfolios to the current interest rates.
Thus, lenders often agreed to waive acceleration 5 upon sale of the sub-
ject property in return for a promise by the purchaser to pay a higher
rate of interest. 6 Borrowers and purchasers opposed to such conduct
began to challenge due-on provisions in court.7
1. When the event leading to the lender's use of the provision is an outright transfer of
the property, it is often referred to as a "due-on-sale" clause. This phrase will be used to
refer exclusively to these transactions.
2. Frequently, the due-on clause also contains a provision requiring the borrower to
obtain the lender's consent before a sale of the property. Traditionally, the decision to de-
mand repayment of the loan upon sale, or to withhold consent to assumption, has been
subject to the unfettered discretion of the lender, except as limited by statute. Eg., CAL.
CIV. CODE § 2924.6 (West Supp. 1980) forbids such action after certain transfers. If the
borrower sells the property without obtaining the required consent, or does not pay the
balance of the loan when demanded to do so, then the lender commences foreclosure pro-
ceedings against the property. Often the lender foregoes its right to demand immediate
repayment of the loan if the purchaser agrees to assume the loan at an increased rate of
interest. A written assumption agreement is then sent to the purchaser for his signature. A
refusal to accept these conditions also leads to foreclosure proceedings.
3. Kratovil, A New Dilemma For Thft Institutions: Judicial Emasculation of the Due-
On-Sale Clause, 12 JOHN MARSHALL J. OF PRAC. & PROC. 299, 299 (1979) [hereinafter cited
as Kratovil].
4. Id.
5. "Acceleration" refers to the lender's demand for immediate repayment of the bal-
ance of the loan.
6. Kratovil, supra note 3, at 300. For a discussion of the propriety of allowing use of
the due-on-sale clause to raise interest rates, see notes 81-86 infra and accompanying text.
7. Kratovil, supra note 3, at 300.
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAWREVIEW [Vol. 13
Wellenkamp v. Bank of America' involved the third challenge to
due-on clauses to reach the California Supreme Court in the past seven
years.9 In Wellenkamp, the court held that enforcement of a due-on
clause by an institutional lender, upon an outright sale of the mort-
gaged property, constituted an unreasonable restraint on alienation, ab-
sent a demonstration by the lender that its security interest was
impaired. 10 The effect of Wellenkamp is virtually to eliminate all exer-
cises of due-on-sale clauses in loan agreements subject to the holding."
This Note discusses the court's rationale in Wellenkamp. The
court's reliance on prior California "due-on" cases and its use of the
restraints on alienation doctrine to determine the validity of the due-
on-sale clause are analyzed. It is suggested that requiring a buyer of
mortgaged property to pay the-current rate of interest via the due-on-
sale clause should not, contrary to the court's assertions, be deemed
unreasonable. Rather, unfair exercise of a due-on-sale provision in a
particular case may make such a clause unenforceable because of es-
tablished contractual and equitable principles. Therefore, the court's
elimination of such clauses is unnecessary.
In addition, this Note explores several questions concerning the
scope of the Wellenkamp holding. The applicability of Wellenkamp to
non-institutional lenders, to loan agreements securing non-residential
8. 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978).
9. The two cases preceding Wellenkamp were La Sala v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n,
5 Cal. 3d 864, 489 P.2d 1113, 97 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1971) (acceleration upon encumbrance) and
Tucker v. Lassen Say. & Loan Ass'n, 12 Cal. 3d 629, 526 P.2d 1169, 116 Cal. Rptr. 633
(1974) (acceleration upon execution of an installment land contract).
10. 21 Cal. 3d at 953, 582 P.2d at 976-77, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 386-87.
11. Even if the lender fears impairment to the security, it must litigate the propriety of
acceleration. Given the time delays of litigation, an uncreditworthy buyer is likely to have
already defaulted on the mortgage payments, and foreclosure will be necessary anyway.
Exercise of the due-on-sale clause is therefore impractical. Hetland, After Wellenkamp
(pt.1), CAL. REAL ESTATE MAGAZINE 40, 40 (Dec. 1978) [hereinafter cited as Hetland].
Thus, instead of attempting to enforce the clause, the lender faced with danger to the secur-
ity will probably attempt to get a court-ordered receiver to prevent waste. Id.
There is further difficulty with the court's insistence on impairment to security. The
court in Wellenkamp did not provide guidelines to be used in deciding how much less
creditworthy a buyer need be before acceleration is proper. Ifjustification for acceleration is
found lacking, the lender may be liable to the borrower and purchaser for slander of title
and breach of contract. Thus, even if the lender feels that there is sufficient justification, it
might hesitate to commence foreclosure proceedings. Goodman, The Wellenkamp Decision:
How Will it Affect Real Estate Financing, 54 CAL. STATE B.J. 34, 38 (Jan./Feb. 1979) [here-
inafter cited as Goodman], citing Meadows v. Bakersfield Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 250 Cal. App.
2d 749, 59 Cal. Rptr. 34 (1967), in which the court of appeals indicated that an action for
slander of title may lie against a lender for wrongfully recording a notice of default and sale
pursuant to a deed of trust.
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property, and to federally chartered savings and loan associations re-
mains in dispute.
Finally, this Note examines the use of alternative lending devices,
such as the variable rate mortgage, which enable lenders to recapture
some of the benefits formerly provided by the due-on-sale clause.
II. FACTS OF THE CASE
In July, 1973, the Mans' purchased a parcel of real property
financed by a $19,100 loan from the Bank of America, at an interest
rate of 8% per annum. The Mans' gave the bank their promissory note,
secured by a deed of trust on the property. The deed of trust contained
a standard due-on-sale clause.
12
Two years later, the Mans' sold the property to Cynthia Wel-
lenkamp. Wellenkamp paid the Mans' their equity and agreed to as-
sume the balance of their loan., Learning of the sale, the bank notified
Wellenkamp of its right to accelerate. The bank offered to waive accel-
eration if Wellenkamp agreed to assume the Mans' loan at the current
rate of interest, 9 1/4% per annum. When Wellenkamp refused, the
bank sought to enforce the due-on-sale clause, and filed a notice of
default and election to sell under the deed of trust. Wellenkamp sought
an injunction against enforcement of the due-on-sale clause. 3
The superior court dismissed the complaint, stating that automatic
enforcement of a due-on clause upon an outright sale of the property
was valid under California law. The court of appeal affirmed. Wel-
lenkamp petitioned the California Supreme Court for a hearing.
III. REASONING OF THE COURT
The supreme court granted Wellenkamp's petition and reversed
the decision of the trial court.
The issue in Wellenkamp was whether the exercise of a due-on
clause in an outright sale1 4 constituted an unreasonable restraint on
12. In pertinent part, the clause provided that if the borrower "sells, conveys, alienates
...said property or any part thereof, or any interest therein... in any manner or way,
whether voluntarily or involuntarily ... [the bank] shall have the right at its option, to
declare said note . ..secured hereby . . . immediately due and payable without notice
. " 21 Cal. 3d at 946, 582 P.2d at 972, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 381.
13. The foreclosure proceedings were suspended pending the outcome of the litigation.
Id. at 947 n.2, 582 P.2d at 972 n.2, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 381 n.2.
14. The court defined an outright sale as one in which both legal title and possession
pass to the buyer. Id. at 949, 582 P.2d at 974, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 383.
1980]
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alienation, 5 absent a showing of impairment to the lender's security
interest. The court summarized California law concerning restraints on
alienation. 6 Of primary importance to the court were two cases in
which the California Supreme Court discussed whether or not the ac-
celeration of a loan was an unreasonable restraint on alienation.17 In
these cases, the court fashioned a reasonableness test, balancing the
quantum of restraint with the justification for such restraint.' 8 Apply-
ing the reasonableness standard, the court concluded that enforcement
of the clause in the two situations presented was unreasonable unless
the lender demonstrated impairment to its security.19
In Wellenkamp, the California Supreme Court employed the bal-
ancing test formulated in its prior decisions. Addressing first the ques-
tion of the quantum of restraint, the court noted that assumption of an
existing loan is often the only means by which a prospective buyer is
able to obtain sufficient funding to purchase a piece of property.20 If
the lender refuses to permit assumption and elects to exercise its option
to accelerate, then transfer of the property may be prohibited entirely.21
If the lender permits assumption, but only at an increased rate of inter-
est, then transfer is still inhibited. 2 Thus, the buyer can insist that the
15. The Wellenkamp court noted that only unreasonable restraints are disallowed. Id.
at 948, 582 P.2d at 973, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 382.
16. CAL. Civ.. CODE § 711 (West 1954) provides that "[c]onditions restraining aliena-
tion, when repugnant to the interest created, are void." Coast Bank v. Minderhout, 61 Cal.
2d 311, 392 P.2d 265, 38 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1964), overruled on other grounds, 21 Cal. 3d 943,
582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978), construed § 711 together with the common law rule
against restraints on alienation as forbidding only unreasonable restraints.
17. In the first case, the lender attempted to enforce a due-on clause upon the borrower's
placement of a junior encumbrance on the subject property. La Sala v. American Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 5 Cal. 3d 864, 489 P.2d 1113, 97 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1971). In the other, enforce-
ment of the provision resulted from the borrower's entrance into an installment land con-
tract. Tucker v. Lassen Say. & Loan Ass'n, 12 Cal. 3d 629,526 P.2d 1169, 116 Cal. Rptr. 633
(1974).
18. The balancing test as such was announced in Tucker. 12 Cal. 3d at 636, 526 P.2d at
1176, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 637. The Tucker court noted that the principles from which this test
was derived were articulated in La Sala. Id. at 635, 526 P.2d at 1176, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 637.
The court in La Sala stressed both the degree of restraint imposed by acceleration upon
encumbrance, see5 Cal. 3d at 880 n.17, 489 P.2d at 1123 n.17, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 859 n.17, and
the reasons advanced by the lender for acceleration, see id at 881, 489 P.2d at 1124, 97 Cal.
Rptr. at 880. In doing so, the La Sala.court was clearly using the Tucker "two tier" ap-
proach. For a discussion of the Wellenkamp court's use of La Sala and Tucker to justify its
holding, see notes 35-70 infra and accompanying text.
19. La Sala v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 5 Cal. 3d at 882, 489 P.2d at 1124-25, 97
Cal. Rptr. at 860-61; Tucker v. Lassen Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 12 Cal. 3d at 638-39, 526 P.2d at
1175, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 639.
20. 21 Cal. 3d at 950, 582 P.2d at 974, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 383.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 950, 582 P.2d at 975, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 384.
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seller absorb the increased payments by lowering the purchase price of
the property.
23
The court next considered the two factors advanced in justification
of enforcement of the due-on-sale clause: impairment of security, and
the opportunity for the lender to raise the interest rate. The court con-
cluded that because the resulting restraint is great, exercise of the due-
on-sale provision is not justified unless a legitimate interest of the
lender is threatened.24 Such interests do not include the lender's desire
to maintain its loan portfolios at current rates of interest.25 A lender's
legitimate interest extends only to the protection of the security from
the danger of waste, should the buyer be uncreditworthy.26 The exist-
ence of a security risk is a question of fact to be deteimined by the
circumstances surrounding a particular sale. The mere fact that the
seller no longer retains an interest in the property after transfer of both
legal title and possession does not necessarily endanger the security.
Therefore, automatic enforcement of the due-on clause upon sale is un-
warranted.27
Thus, the Wellenkamp court concluded that an institutional lender
cannot exercise a due-on clause even upon a sale of the property, unless
it can demonstrate that its security is impaired.28
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Prior California 'Due-On" Cases: Did the Wellenkamp Court
Correctly Interpret Its Own Precedent?
In the Wellenkamp opinion, the California Supreme Court focused
on three cases in which it addressed the question of the enforceability
of due-on clauses. In Coast Bank v. Minderhout,29 the primary issue
was not the propriety of the due-on clause. Rather, it was whether or
not a written security agreement between the bank and the borrower
constituted an equitable mortgage.30 The instrument in question in
23. Id.
24. Id. at 951, 582 P.2d at 975, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 384.
25. Id. at 952, 582 P.2d at 976, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
26. Id. at 953, 582 P.2d at 976-77, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 385-86.
27. Id. at 951-52, 582 P.2d at 975-76, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 384-85.
28. Id. at 953, 582 P.2d at 976-77, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 385-86.
29. 61 Cal. 2d 311, 392 P.2d 265, 38 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1964).
30. An equitable mortgate is an executory agreement which is insufficient to create a
legal mortgage. However, because the contracting parties adequately indicate an intent to
make some particular property security for a debt, equity implies a mortgage. Thus, if an
equitable mortgage is found, the creditor can enforce the debt by foreclosing the "lien" on
the property.
1980]
LOYOLt OF LOS 4NGELES LAWREVIEW
Coast Bank contained an acceleration clause. In its adoption of the
reasonableness test on restraints on alienation,3' the court suggested in
dictum that the due-on provision was reasonable. 32 The courts of ap-
peal repeatedly interpreted Coast Bank as providing that due-on
clauses constituted per se reasonable restraints.33 In the absence of fur-
ther California Supreme Court opinions on the issue, this interpreta-
tion was the accepted law in California.34
In 1971, the California Supreme Court decided its first "due-on"
case since Coast Bank. In La Sala v. American Savings and Loan Asso-
ciation,35 the lender attempted to enforce the due-on clause when the
borrower placed a junior encumbrance on the property. The crucial
question in La Sala was whether the principles established in Coast
Bank justified automatic enforcement of the due-on clause in the event
of an encumbrance. 36 Applying the reasonableness standard to the sit-
uation before it, the La Sala court concluded that Coast Bank was dis-
tinguishable on its facts. Because a junior encumbrance neither
terminates the borrower's interest in the property nor involves a trans-
fer of possession, the court reasoned,37 the encumbrance does not nec-
essarily create a risk to the lender's security interest.38 Unlike
acceleration upon sale, acceleration upon encumbrance imposes a sig-
nificant restraint on alienation, by effectively prohibiting future encum-
brances. The borrower will rarely, if ever, receive enough money from
the junior encumbrance to pay the first trust deed in full. 3 9 In addition,
31. See note 16 supra.
32. 61 Cal. 2d at 317, 392 P.2d at 268, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 508.
33. Cherry v. Home Say. & Loan Ass'n, 276 Cal. App. 2d 574, 81 Cal. Rptr. 135 (1969)
(lender can validly refuse to consent to sale if purchaser of property refuses to assume the
loan at a higher rate of interest); Hellbaum v. Lytton Say. & Loan Ass'n, 274 Cal. App. 2d
456, 79 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1969) (lender has valid interest in maintaining direct responsibility of
parties on whose credit loan was made); Jones v. Sacramento Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 248 Cal.
App. 2d 522, 56 Cal. Rptr. 741 (1967) (acceleration clause contained in trust deed securing
construction loan not an invalid restraint on alienation). But see Note, Applying the Brakes
to Acceleration Clauses Controlling Their Misuse In Real Property Secured Transactions, 9
CAL. WESTERN L. REV. 514, 524-25 (1973) in which it is suggested that the use by the court
in Coast Bank of the words "in the present case" implies that reasonableness must be deter-
mined on a case-to-case basis, and that the Coast Bank court only approved of the use of the
due-on clause as applied to that particular transaction.
34. The court in Wellenkamp overruled that portion of Coast Bank concerning the due-
on-sale clause. 21 Cal. 3d at 953, 582 P.2d at 977, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 386. Cherry and
Hellbaum were expressly disapproved by the court. Id.
35. 5 Cal. 3d 864, 489 P.2d 1113, 97 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1971).
36. Id. at 879, 489 P.2d at 1122-23, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 859.
37. Id. at 880, 489 P.2d at 1123, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 859.
38. Id. at 880-81, 489 P.2d at 1123-24, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 859-60.
39. Id. at 880 n.17, 489 P.2d at 1122-23 n.17, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 859-60 n.17.
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acceleration upon sale permits the lender to loan the money to someone
else at a more favorable rate of interest and ensures that all buyers of
property finance at the current rate.4" This consideration does not exist
in the instant situation when the property has not been transferred.
Thus, the La Sala court concluded that acceleration when the borrower
further encumbers the property is an unreasonable restraint on aliena-
tion unless the lender can demonstrate that its security interest is im-
paired.4'
In 1974, a lender's application of the due-on clause was again chal-
lenged in the California Supreme Court. In Tucker v. Lassen Savings
and Loan Association,42 the event triggering acceleration was the bor-
rower's entrance into an installment land contract.43 After bhiefly sum-
marizing California law concerning restraints on alienation, the Tucker
court held that the reasonableness of any restraint is determined by
balancing the quantum of restraint against the justification for the re-
straint.' As to the quantum of restraint, the court concluded that en-
forcement of the due-on clause prevents conveyance by installment
contract.45 The court reasoned that the down payment on the contract,
"like the proceeds of the junior encumbrance in La Sala, 'does not
often provide the borrower with the means to discharge the balance
secured by the [first] trust deed.' "46 The Tucker court then considered
the justifications advanced by the lender for enforcement of the due-on
clause: the risk of waste and the desire to raise the interest rate on the
loan. The court concluded that the execution of an installment contract
does not necessarily endanger the security,47 because the seller retains
an equitable interest in the property until the purchase price is paid in
full and, therefore, has the incentive to prevent the purchaser's de-
fault a.4  The court also stated that the lender's desire to maintain its
loan portfolios at current rates of interest does not justify use of the
due-on clause when the borrower executes an installment land contract.
Referring to the loan rate justification, the court stated that "[w]hatever
40. Id.
41. Id. at 878, 489 P.2d at 1121, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 857.
42. 12 Cal. 3d 629, 526 P.2d 1169, 116 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1974).
43. An installment land contract is a contract for the sale of real property in which the
seller agrees to accept the purchase money from the buyer in installments. While the buyer
gains possession of the property immediately, or after an agreed number of payments, legal
title is not transferred until the entire purchase price is paid.
44. 12 Cal. 3d at 636, 526 P.2d at 1174, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 637.
45. Id. at 637, 526 P.2d at 1176, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 638.
46. Id. (citations omitted). -
47. Id. at 638, 526 P.2d at 1174, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 638.
48. Id. at 639 n.9, 526 P.2d at 1175 n.9, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 639 n.9.
1980]
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cogency this argument may retain concerning the relatively mild re-
straint in the case of an outright sale. . . it lacks all force in the case of
the serious and extreme restraint which would result from the auto-
matic enforcement of 'due-on' clauses in the context of installment land
contracts."4 9 After weighing the above factors, the Tucker court held
that the lender cannot enforce the due-on clause when the borrower
enters into an installment land contract, unless the lender can show
impairment to its security interest.50
In Wellenkamp, the bank distinguished La Sala and Tucker on
two grounds. Addressing the quantum of restraint issue, the bank con-
tended that while acceleration upon encumbrance or sale of the subject
property by installment land contract imposes a significant restraint on
alienation, no such restraint exists when the property is transferred out-
right.51 For its assertion, the bank relied on La Sala and Tucker which
stated that the restraint resulting from acceleration upon sale is de min-
imus.
5 2
The Wellenkamp court disagreed with the bank's contention. The
court maintained that the dictum in La Sala and Tucker, which was
cited by the bank, concerned only "outright" sales, which the We-
lenkamp court then defined as sales in which the seller receives full
payment from the buyer.
53
The bank further asserted that even if exercise of the due-on-sale
clause upon an outright sale did impose a restraint, such restraint was
justified. The bank offered two grounds for this conclusion. First, the
borrower no longer has incentive to prevent waste and default, because
he transfers both title and possession to the buyer.54 Second, in out-
right sales, lenders should be allowed to waive exercise of due-on-sale
clauses and demand an increase in the interest rate of the loan to reflect
current market conditions.55
In responding to these arguments, the Wellenkamp court acknowl-
edged that it had formerly recognized a difference between junior en-
cumbrances and installment contracts, where the borrower retains
49. Id. at 639 n.10, 526 P.2d at 1175-76 n.10, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 639.40 n.10.
50. Id. at 638-39, 526 P.2d at 1175, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 639. The Tucker court made re-
peated attempts to distinguish Coast Bank on the grounds that the language in Coast Bank
concerned only "outright" sales. It is not altogether clear what the Tucker court meant by
the term "outright." See notes 65-68 infra and accompanying text.
51. 21 Cal. 3d at 949-50, 582 P.2d at 974-75, 148 Cal. Rptr at 382-83.
52. Id. at 949, 582 P.2d at 974, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 383.
53. Id. The court reasoned that the restraint in such cases is slight because the seller
receives enough cash to discharge the balance of the loan.
54. Id. at 951, 582 P.2d at 975, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 384.
55. Id. at 952, 582 P.2d at 976, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
[Vol. 13
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some interest in the property, and sales, where he does not.5 6 However,
the court reasoned that application of the Tucker balancing test5 7 to
outright sales mandated the conclusion that this mere absence of prop-
erty interest does not warrant enforcement of the due-on-sale clause. 8
The court also rejected the loan portfolio argument as an improper jus-
tification for exercise of a due-on-sale clause.5 9
Upon examination of the bases for the decisions in La Sala and
Tucker, it is apparent that the Wellenkamp court's reliance on these
cases was misplaced. In La Sala and Tucker, the court reaffirmed
Coast Bank, stressing the differences between sales and the transactions
under consideration. Moreover, the Wellenkamp court failed to notice
that there was no mention in La Sala of so-called "outright" sales.
That term appeared for the first time in Tucker." The court in La Sala
distinguished between sales and encumbrances. 6 A sale divests the
seller of any interest in the property. Acceleration in this situation,
therefore, is permissible because the lender has a legitimate interest in
maintaining, in a position of direct responsibility for the subject prop-
erty, the parties upon whose credit rating it relied in making the loan.62
Contrary to a sale, an encumbrance neither terminates the borrower's
interest in the property nor does it involve a transfer of possession.63
Thus, the La Sala court concluded that while "the lender may insist
upon automatic enforcement of the due-on-sale clause because such a
provision is necessary to protect the lender's security . . . the power
lodged in the lender by the due-on-encumbrance clause can claim no
such mechanical justification."
64
There is further difficulty with the Wellenkamp court's analysis of
the Tucker opinion. Although the court in Tucker made several refer-
ences to outright sales, the court did not necessarily intend the same
meaning for the term as did the Wellenkamp court. The term "out-
56. Id. at 951, 582 P.2d at 975, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 384.
57. See text accompanying note 44 supra.
58. 21 Cal. 3d at 951-52, 582 P.2d at 975-76, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 384-85.
59. Id. See notes 74-82 infra and accompanying text.
60. See 12 Cal. 3d at 634, 526 P.2d at 1172, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 636.
61. The La Sala court stated:
[A]lithough California cases have clearly held a due-on-sale clause valid, the
language in such cases respecting due-on-encumbrance provisions is ... entirely
dictum. We must inquire into the bases upon which the cases approved the due-
on-sale clause to determine whether those reasons apply in full measure to re-
straints against future encumbrances.
5 Cal. 3d at 879, 489 P.2d at 1122-23, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 858-59.
62. Id., 489 P.2d at 1123, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 859.
63. Id. at 880, 489 P.2d at 1123, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 859.
64. Id. at 883-84, 489 P.2d at 1126, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 862 (emphasis added).
19801
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right" is subject to more than one interpretation. An "outright" sale
can refer either to a sale in which both legal title and possession pass to
the buyer, although the buyer may take subject to or assume the ex-
isting loan, or a sale in which the buyer pays all cash for the property,
enabling the seller to retire the outstanding mortgage.
6 5
The Tucker court appeared to use "outright" in both of these con-
texts.6 6 At least one student author suggested that the distinction the
court attempted to draw was between transactions such as encum-
brances and installment contracts, in which the borrower retains some
interest in the property, and sales, in which the borrower's equity is
cashed out.67  Equating an "outright" sale to one in which the seller
receives the purchase price in cash, the court in Tucker did not limit
automatic enforcement of the due-on clause to sales of this type.
Rather, the court ignored economic reality and assumed that every
time both legal title and possession are passed immediately to the
buyer, the buyer pays the seller the purchase price in cash. 8
The Wellenkamp court misunderstood the context in which the
term "outright" was used. The court eradicated the La Sala and Tuck-
er distinction between transactions in which the borrower retains some
interest in the property and those in which he does not. According to
one commentator, the Wellenkamp decision "effectively disagrees with
every prior due-on case in California.169 The distinction between sales
in which the buyer pays the purchase price in cash and those in which
65. Note, The Demise ofthe Due-On-Sale Clause, 64 CALIF. L. REv. 573, 582 (1976).
The author maintained that the passing of legal title and possession is a more reasonable
interpretation of the phrase "outright sale."
66. At one point in its opinion, the court stated:
[I]n the case of the installment land contract the vendor retains legal title until the
purchase price has been fully paid. . . [he] has a considerable interest in maintain-
ing the property until the total proceeds under the contract are received; in this he
differs markedly from the vendor of property where there has been an outright sale.
12 Cal. 3d at 638, 526 P.2d at 1174-75, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 638-39 (emphasis added). Yet,
earlier, in a footnote, the court maintained that "[by the term 'outright' sale, we refer to the
transaction wherein the seller receives full payment from and transfers legal title to the
buyer." Id. at 634 n.6, 526 P.2d at 1172 n.6, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 636 n.6 (emphasis added).
67. Note, The Demise ofthe Due-on-Sale Clause, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 573, 582 (1976). In
the course of its discussion, the Tucker court cited Coast Bank and La Sala for the proposi-
tion that enforcement of the due-on clause is reasonable when the property has been sold
because "[a] sale of the property usually divests the vendor of any interest in that property,
and involves the transfer of possession, with responsibility for maintenance and unkeep, to
the vendee." 12 Cal. 3d at 634, 526 P.2d at 1172, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 636 (citations omitted).
68. The court's language supports this conclusion: "[In a sale] the trustor-vendor nor-
mally receives enough money through the financing of the second sale to pay off his note,
and he is normally required to do so." Id. at 637, 526 P.2d at 1174, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 638.
69. Dunn, Enforcement of Due-On-Transfer Clauses, 13 REAL PROP., PROB., & TRUST J.
891, 914 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Dunn].
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he does not is unwarranted. Regardless of whether cash is paid, a bor-
rower divests himself of his interest in the property. Accordingly, he
has no further incentive to prevent waste. In this regard, every sale
results in an automatic impairment to the lender's security interest.7"
B. The Court's Use of the Restraints On Alienation Doctrine to
Determine the Validity of the Due-On-Sale Clause
Fundamental to the Wellenkamp decision was the notion that en-
forcement of the due-on-sale clause upon any sale of the mortgaged
property, except a sale in which the purchase price is paid in full, con-
stitutes a restraint on alienation.7" The court reasoned that in times of
inflation, funds available for real estate financing are in short supply,
and property can only be sold if the buyer is permitted to give the seller
a small down payment and assume the balance of the seller's outstand-
ing loan.72 If the lender refuses to permit assumption and exercises the
option to accelerate the loan, then it can prohibit the sale of the subject
property. Due to the difficulty of obtaining outside financing in an in-
flationary period, the buyer will be unable to substitute a new loan for
the loan being called due. Furthermore, the small down payment
which the buyer gives to the seller is not sufficient to discharge that
loan.73
An inhibitory effect on transfer results even if the lender is willing
to waive acceleration in return for the buyer's assumption of the ex-
isting loan at an increased rate of interest.74 If the buyer is forced to
pay a higher interest rate, then he will insist that the seller lower the
purchase price.75 Consequently, the seller must choose between lower-
ing the purchase price and absorbing the loss, maintaining a higher
purchase price and not attracting buyers, or refusing to sell.76
The court in Wellenkamp is in error in its assertion that permitting
assumption of the loan only at the current rate of interest results in an
increased restraint on alienation. Obviously, if the buyer has to spend
70. Admittedly, the court in Wellenkamp sanctioned acceleration when the buyer is in-
solvent or a poor credit risk. However, in most situations, this will not be the case. Yet, in
issuing a loan, a lender relies upon a prospective borrower's credit rating and personal back-
ground. When the property is sold and the loan is assumed, the lender is forced to accept a
new debtor whom it has not had time to evaluate.
71. A restraint on alienation is any restriction placed upon the owner of real property
which hinders his power to convey an interest in that property.
72. 21 Cal. 3d at 950, 582 P.2d at 974, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 383.
73. Id., 582 P.2d at 974, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 383.
74. Id., 582 P.2d at 975, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 384.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 950-51, 582 P.2d at 975, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 384.
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a certain amount of the purchase money on interest, then the amount
which he is able to pay to the seller is reduced. However, as the dissent
noted in Wellenkamp, the resulting inhibition is not due to the exercise
of the due-on-sale provision per se, but rather, to the fact that interest
rates are high in an inflationary economy.71 If the property is unen-
cumbered, then the prospective buyer will have to finance the purchase
elsewhere, paying the current rates. Thus, there is no increased re-
straint caused by enforcement of a due-on-sale clause. The buyer is
forced only to do that which he would have to do were he purchasing
unencumbered property.78 In times when mortgage funds are difficult
to obtain, the lender who allows assumption is actually facilitating
transfer by relieving the buyer of the burden of obtaining outside
financing.
Despite evidence to the contrary, the court reasoned that enforce-
ment of due-on-sale clauses constitutes a restraint on alienability.
Applying the balancing test, the court then assessed the justifica-
tion advanced for the restraint.79 The court held that the only adequate
justification for such restraint is the protection of the lender against
having to resort to the security upon default by an uncreditworthy
buyer.8 0
In so holding, the court rejected the bank's contention that a
lender's desire to maintain its loan portfolios at the current rate of in-
terest justifies the restraint imposed by the exercise of the due-on-sale
clause.81 The court asserted that "a restraint on alienation cannot be
found reasonable merely because it is commercially beneficial to the
restrainor."82
It is arguable that the lender's use of the due-on-sale clause to
bring the interest rate up to the current market level is not unreasona-
77. Id. at 956-57, 582 P.2d at 978-79, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 387-88 (Clark, J., dissenting).
78. See id. at 956, 582 P.2d at 979, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 388. One commentator aptly
summed up the Wellenkamp rationale:
[It] provides to the seller of favorably encumbered property an economic advan-
tage in pricing over sellers of unfavorably encumbered identical property, under
the guise of a restraint on alienation. . . . To label the loss of a purported
favorable economic position as a restraint on alienation is a misconception of that
doctrine which was not intended to provide profitability of alienation but only the
ability to alienate without penalty. The loss of an advantage premised upon void-
ing of a contract can hardly be considered a penalty. This theory then simply
espouses the breach of that portion of a contract which one finds unfavorable, and
affirmance of that portion of a contract which is favorable.
Dunn, supra note 69, at 926.
79. 21 Cal. 3d at 951, 582 P.2d at 975, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 384.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 952, 582 P.2d at 976, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
82. Id. at 953, 582 P.2d at 976, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
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ble. A period of inflation requires the lender to raise interest rates to
increase the yield on its loan portfolios.13 One means by which the
lender is able to accomplish this is through the due-on-sale clause.84
Admittedly, a strong argument can be made against permitting the ex-
ercise of a due-on clause when the borrower merely encumbers the
property. In that situation, the lender is pressuring the borrower into
altering a valid contract because that contract has become unfavorable
to the lender. However, the same cannot be asserted when there is a
sale. In a sale, both the borrower and the lender have the benefit of
their original bargain.85 Not a beneficiary of the original contract, the
prospective purchaser is simply required to pay the rate which would
be demanded of him were he to obtain outside financing.
In purporting to strike down an unreasonable restraint on aliena-
tion, the Wellenkamp court announced a new rule which benefits only a
limited number of individuals: buyers and sellers of encumbered real
property. 6 The price for the court's decision is paid not only by lend-
ers, but by potential future borrowers who will face increased inteiest
rates and decreased mortgage funds because lenders are locked into
long-term, low interest loans. Perhaps the biggest burden is borne by
sellers of unencumbered real property who do not have an attractive
long-term, low interest loan to offer to prospective buyers. Thus, they
will have a more difficult time selling their property.
C. Possible Alternative Approaches to Remedy Abuse of the Due-On-
Sale Clause
Due-on-sale clauses give a lender a great deal of power that may
83. Kratovil, supra note 3, at 309. Kratovil argued that assurance of the continued exist-
ence of financial institutions to finance the purchase of homes should be as important a
policy objective as preventing abuse of the due-on-sale clause. He noted that most institu-
tions making long-term real estate loans are savings and loan associations. Such associa-
tions make home purchases possible, by lending money and distributing earnings, in the
form of interest, to depositors, many of whom are also home buyers. Raising interest rates
upon the sale of mortgaged property increases the funds available for these two purposes.
Id. at 314.
84. Century Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n of Bridgeton v. Van Glahn, 144 N.J. Super. 48, 54,
364 A.2d 558, 562 (1976). The New Jersey Superior Court noted that if interest rates drop,
the borrower benefits at the expense of the lender. Thus, in this situation, the borrower can
borrow elsewhere at the lower rate, and pay off the loan, forcing the lender to lend to some-
one else at the less favorable rate.
85. Malouff v. Midland Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 181 Colo. 294, 509 P.2d 1240 (1973)
(exercise of a due-on clause presumed reasonable when the property has been sold).
86. Kratovil, supra note 3, at 314. Kratovil maintained that a person with enough cash
to put a down payment on mortgaged property is hardly a "downtrodden consumer" in need
of the type of protection which the holding in Wellenkamp was designed to afford.
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be abused. There are alternative ways to deal with such abuses, while
permitting exercise of the clause when it merely requires the prospec-
tive purchaser to pay the current rate of interest.
1. Unconscionability
The only means by which a lender can enforce a due-on-sale
clause against an unwilling borrower is to foreclose the lien on the
property. 87 Because foreclosure is an equitable proceeding, 8 tradi-
tional equitable defenses are available to the borrower. These defenses
may be grouped under the general concept of unconscionability. 9
It is well settled that a court in equity will refuse to enforce an
unconscionable bargain.9" In general, relief should be provided from
an acceleration provision if the lender acts unfairly,91 or if enforcement
in the particular situation will cause oppression and injustice to the
borrower.
92
Although a lender may justifiably condition a waiver upon pay-
ment of the current rate of interest, it should not be allowed to use the
threat of acceleration to exact onerous collateral benefits from the bor-
rower or purchaser. If additional waiver or transfer fees are de-
manded,93  then this should be prima facie evidence of
unconscionability. This is indeed the law in California with regard to
prepayment penalty provisions in deeds of trust. These provisions are
presumed reasonable absent a showing by the borrower that the
charges are exorbitant.
94
Even in the absence of such overreaching conduct on the part of
the lender, a balancing of the equities may weigh against application of
the acceleration clause in a particular case. Adopting this approach,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded that impairment of security,
87. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 726 (West Supp. 1980).
88. Hopkins v. Anderson, 218 Cal. 62, 65, 21 P.2d 560, 561 (1933).
89. The term "unconscionability" is used in this section in its broadest sense. It encom-
passes agreements which are unconscionable when formed, as well as those deemed uncon-
scionable at the time of enforcement.
90. Rosenthal, The Role of Courts of Equiy in PreventingAcceleration Predicated Upon a
Mortgagor's Inadvertent Default, 22 SYRACUSE L. REv. 897, 909 (1971).
91. J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 439 (5th ed. 1941).
92. Id. § 455(a).
93. Courts of other jurisdictions accepting the portfolio justification for enforcement of
the due-on-sale clause have recognized that its exercise is limited in this way. E.g., Baker v.
Loves Park Say. & Loan Ass'n, 6 I1. 2d 119, 333 N.E.2d 1 (1975) (due-on-sale clause not
enforced if lender's conduct is unconscionable, or if lender unreasonably withholds consent
to transfer).
94. Lazzareschi Inv. Co. v. San Francisco Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 22 Cal. App. 3d 303,
311, 99 Cal. Rptr. 417, 422 (1971).
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which the Wellenkamp court used as the sole test of enforceability, is
one of many factors to consider.95 In addition, a court should consider
whether, at the time he entered into the contract, the borrower was
aware that acceleration could be waived if a prospective purchaser of
the property agreed to assume the loan at an increased rate of inter-
est.96 Another factor to be taken into account is that the acceleration
clause may be the result of an inequality of bargaining power.
97
Laches98 and estoppel99 are other concerns bearing on enforceability.
One criticism levelled at permitting a lender to use the due-on-sale
clause to maintain its portfolios at current interest rates is that the bor-
rower, when signing the contract, may be unaware that the lender will
exercise it for this purpose."°° This problem can be all6viated by re-
drafting the clause to state that part of the lender's criteria for deter-
mining the acceptability of a buyer is the latter's willingness to pay the
current interest rate. Additionally, the clause might state that one of
the purposes of the acceleration provision is to effect an increase in
interest rates upon sale. 10 1 These warnings have been encouraged by
the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, which promulgates regulations
governing federal savings and loan associations.'0 2 These regulations
require that at a time no later than the closing agreement, full disclo-
sure of the contractual obligations be made to the borrowing party.
0 3
This includes disclosure not only of the existence of the due-on-sale
95. Mutual Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. American Medical Servs., Inc., 66 Wis. 2d 210,
223 N.W.2d 921 (1974).
96. For further consideration of the desirability of requiring full disclosure to the bor-
rower of all possible uses of the due-on-sale clause, see text accompanying notes 100-04
infra.
97. This may also weigh in favor of a determination that the due-on-sale provision is an
unenforceable contract of adhesion. See text accompanying notes 105-15 infra.
98. Mutual Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. American Medical Servs., Inc., 66 Wis. 2d at 218-
19, 223 N.W.2d at 925. The borrower might raise the defense of laches if the lender waited
an undue length of time before attempting to accelerate.
99. See id. at 219, 223 N.W.2d at 925. Estoppel might be found if the lender has, on past
occasions, foregone any attempt to enforce the due-on clause.
100. See Hetland, supra note 11, at 43.
101. Kratovil, supra note 3, at 315 (arguing that such explanations should be part of the
written mortgage agreement).
102. See notes 140-70 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the inconsistencies
between state and federal law with regard to due-on provisions.
103. 12 C.F.R. § 556.9(a) (1979) provides:
The Board (Federal Home Loan Bank Board) allows federal savings and loan as-
sociations certain authority to incorporate into loan instruments provisions for im-
position of late charges, prepayment charges, and exercise of acceleration clauses.
The Board expects associations to adopt procedures sufficient to ensure that, no
later than the time of loan closing, the rights and obligations of the contracting
parties are fully and specifically disclosed to borrowers.
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clause, 1° 4 but also of its purpose and possible applications.
2. Contract of adhesion
A due-on-sale clause is a lender's contract option to call the loan
due or negotiate the interest rate. 0 5 A borrower against whom the pro-
vision is unjustifiably enforced can thus obtain relief through applica-
tion of the traditional contractual remedy providing relief from a
contract of adhesion.
A contract of adhesion is a standard form contract in which. a
weaker party is forced to agree, or "adhere" to, the terms presented by
a stronger party. The contract terms reflect a basic inequality of bar-
gaining power. 1
0 6
Recognizing that standardized contracts have a valid and useful
function, courts have reasoned that inequality of bargaining power
does not automatically render the contract invalid. 10 7 The inequality of
bargaining power must be manifested either in the contractual terms or
in the enforcement of the contract.
Courts recognize that the nature of some contractual terms renders
them automatically unenforceable.' 08 Often, the terms are so onerous
as to be violative of public policy.10 9
Alternatively, an agreement may contain terms which are accepta-
ble when the contract is formed. It is abusive or unreasonable conduct
on the part of the stronger party that makes a contract adhesive in its
application. 110
A deed of trust is not invalid per se. 1' However, because of the
104. If the lender conceals the existence of the clause from the borrower, then it might be
voidable on that basis alone. See text accompanying notes 105-15 infra.
105. Kolber, The Due-On-Sale Clause in California, 44 L.A.B. BULL. 64, 68 (1968).
106. Comment, Contracts of Adhesion Under Caif/ornia Law, 1 U.S.F.L. REv. 306, 306
(1967).
107. Schmidt v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 268 Cal. App. 2d 736, 74 Cal. Rptr. 367 (1969)
(clause limiting insurer's liability to disabilities occuring within twenty days of insured's
accident not void simply because contract presented to insured on a "take it or leave it"
basis).
108. Hetland, Secured Real Estate Transactions, C.E.B. 77 (1974).
109. The most notable examples of clauses disallowed on this theory are disclaimers of
warranties appearing in fine print on the back of contracts for the purchase of goods. E.g.,
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960) (automobile
purchase contract). Further examples of such clauses are provided by agreements in which
the adhering party relieves the party who drafts the contract of liability for the latter's negli-
gence. Eg., Tunkl v. Board of Regents, 60 Cal. 2d 92, 382 P.2d 441, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963)
(contract relieving hospital employees of liability for negligence).
110. Hetland, Secured Real Estate Transactions, C.E.B. 77 (1974).
111. See MCA, Inc. v. Universal Diversified Enterprises Corp., 27 Cal. App. 3d 170, 103
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inequality of bargaining position between a relatively unsophisticated
residential home buyer and an institutional lender, the homebuyer may
be able to attack a provision in a trust deed on the grounds that it is
adhesive as applied.
In determining whether or not a contractual term will be enforced
when challenged under this theory, there are certain factors which the
California courts consider. The court analyzes the term in light of the
intent and purpose of the party in the weaker bargaining position. Fur-
thermore, it assesses the knowledge and understanding a reasonable
layperson would possess with respect to the challenged provision. Also
important are the layperson's expectations as to the effect of the provi-
sion and the prominence of the provision within the text of the con-
tract. 1 12
Arguably, enforcement of a due-on-sale clause may be avoided as
adhesive under these four factors. One advantage to the contract of
adhesion approach is that the lender has the opportunity to make the
clause non-adhesive by full disclosure to the borrower of the existence,
purpose, and effect of the due-on-sale provision. Preliminarily, the
due-on-sale clause should appear in clear and bold type in both the
promissory note and the deed of trust.1 3 In addition, the lender should
verbally inform the borrower of the existence of the provision and of its
effect. As an added safeguard, such explanations should also be in-
cluded in the deed of trust. These procedures afford an ignorant bor-
rower needed protection, while ensuring the continued vitality of the
due-on-sale clause to protect a lender's interests.
In the absence of the Wellenkamp rule, a due-on-sale clause is au-
Cal. Rptr. 522 (1972) (holding deed of trust not to be a contract of adhesion when evidence
indicated that all terms were bargained for).
112. For illustrations of situations in which the California Supreme Court applied these
tests, see Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1966)
(clause in insurance policy excluded from coverage any liability on the part of insurer for
intentional torts); Steven v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 862, 377 P.2d 284, 27 Cal. Rptr.
172 (1962) (provision in airline insurance policy purchased out of vending machine limited
coverage to regularly scheduled flights). While most cases in which a contract was chal-
lenged as adhesive as applied involved limited liability clauses in insurance contracts, there
is no reason why the same tests cannot be applied to due-on-sale clauses in deeds of trust.
113. This requirement already exists with regard to residential real property. CAL. Civ.
CODE § 2924.5 (West 1972) provides:
No clause in any deed of trust or mortgage on property containing four or fewer
residential units. . . that provides for the acceleration of the due. date of the obli-
gation upon the sale, conveyance, alienation, lease, succession, assignment or other
transfer of the property subject to the deed of trust or mortgage shall be valid
unless the clause is set forth, in its entirety in both the body of the deed of trust or
mortgage and the promissory note or other document evidencing the secured obli-
gation.
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tomatically enforceable when there is no gross inequality of bargaining
power between the lender and the borrower." 4 Traditional remedies
afforded under the theories of adhesion and unconscionability make
the inflexible rule announced in Wellenkamp unnecessary and undesir-
able. The court in Wellenkamp ignored the desirability of the due-on-
sale clause and failed to realize that unenforceability should be the ex-
ception rather than the rule. A party should not be able to escape his
obligations under a valid contract, absent some showing that enforce-
ment is unfair and unjust."'
D. Scope of the Wellenkamp Decision
Many questions still remain regarding the scope of the holding in
Wellenkamp. Two fundamental unanswered questions are the deci-
sion's applicability to 1) private (non-institutional) lenders, and to 2)
non-residential property.
1. Private lenders
In a footnote in the Wellenkamp opinion, the court expressly lim-
ited its holding to institutional lenders. 6 The question of whether the
court carved out an exception for non-institutional lenders, or exercised
ordinary judicial restraint in only addressing the facts before it awaits
resolution.' In the absence of such a determination, it is useful to
114. See notes 125-39 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of whether or not
Wellenkamp should apply to other than residential mortgages taken out by unsophisticated
homebuyers.
115. Resort to amorphous concepts such as "unconscionability" results in an absence of
guidelines to aid a lender or a borrower in determining the propriety of enforcing a due-on-
sale clause in a given situation. Litigation each time enforcement is attempted is neither
practical nor desirable. Ultimately, litigation must give way to a legislative scheme designed
to regulate recurring abuses. The regulations promulgated by the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board serve as an excellent example of such legislation. See note 103 supra and notes 147-
70 infra and accompanying text. What is to be avoided is the judicial legislation which is
apparent in Wellenkamp. A legislature is best able to control any problems of due-on-sale
clauses. See Dunn, supra note 69, at 936; Kratovil, supra note 3, at 316-17.
116. In the instant case the party seeking enforcement of the due-on clause is an
institutional lender. We limit our holding accordingly. We express no opinion on
the question whether a private lender, including the vendor who takes back secon-
dary financing, has interests which might inherently justify automatic enforcement
of a due-on clause in his favor upon resale.
21 Cal. 3d at 952 n.9, 582 P.2d at 976 n.9, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 385 n.9.
117. The supreme court was presented with an opportunity to rule on this issue in Demey
v. Joujon-Roche, No. 2-48408, 2d Dist. Div. 4 (certified for non-publication Apr. 9, 1979),
which was appealed with Wellenkamp. After granting a hearing in Demey, the supreme
court subsequently retransferred the case to the court of appeal with the instruction that it
must be decided in light of the "substantive principles announced . . . in Wellenkamp."
Demey involved purchase money trust deeds executed to secure four 40 acre tracts of land.
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examine the desirability of a non-institutional lender exemption.
A "private lender" exclusion is meaningful only if the term "pri-
vate lender" is defined. The court appeared to have envisioned a situa-
tion in which the vendor of the property takes back a purchase money
deed of trust. This situation usually occurs when the buyer cannot ob-
tain sufficient funds to purchase the property. To effectuate the sale,
the seller "lends" the buyer money by passing legal title and possession,
but he allows payment in installments." 8 Often, such agreements con-
tain a due-on-sale clause.
1 19
A strong argument can be made that the factors that persuaded the
Wellenkaihp court against enforceability of due-on-sale clauses are ab-
sent from the purchase money trust deed situation. Typically, the
terms of the contract will be more negotiable with a private party than
with an institutional lender. The agreement is less likely to be a con-
tract of adhesion because the lender and the borrower are of more
equal sophistication. Unlike an institutional lender, a private lender
does not exercise a due-on-sale clause to raise interest rates. The only
purpose behind such a provision in a purchase money trust deed is to
assure that the seller will receive full payment of the purchase price.
Therefore, any restraint that the due-on-sale clause imposes on a bor-
rower who borrows from a private lender should be permissible be-
cause it is reasonable.
20
Two other considerations weigh in favor of continuing the "private
lender" exclusion, at least in the situation presented above. An institu-
tional lender, unlike a casual seller of real estate, is in the business of
Each trust deed was printed on a standard form, and each contained a typical due-on-sale
clause. When the purchasers of this property opened up escrows to resell two of the tracts,
the seller announced his intention to enforce the due-on-sale clauses. The seller offered to
waive acceleration on two conditions: first, that the prospective buyers assume the payment
of the trust deeds at the same rate of interest, and second, that they agree to retention of the
due-on-sale clauses as to any further resale. When these conditions were refused, the seller
commenced foreclosure proceedings. The purchasers brought suit. The court of appeal held
that because there was nothing in the record indicating either impairment to the security or a
risk of default, the seller had no right to exercise the due-on-sale clauses or to require as-
sumption of trust deeds containing such clauses. The court awarded damages to the plain-
tiffs. Little can be deduced from the holding in Demey, however, as neither the seller nor the
court mentioned the possibility that private lenders were exempt from Wellenkamp. Demey
was appealed once again to the supreme court. The court ordered the opinion unpublished.
118. See Kratovil, supra note 3, at 308. Such a transaction differs from an installment
land contract in that title, as well as possession, pass immediately to the buyer. The seller
assures his receipt of the purchase price by taking back a deed of trust on the property.
119. Id.
120. For a discussion of these considerations and the conclusion that Wellenkamp should
not apply to sellers taking back purchase money trust deeds, see Dunn, supra note 69, at
916-17.
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making loans. The institutional lender has access to economic forecasts
and information which are considered when interest rates are set. In
addition, because the institutional lender makes numerous loans, it can
spread the risk of a fixed interest rate by adjusting rates on new loans to
reflect current market conditions.' Furthermore, there are alterna-
tives available to the institutional lender, such as the variable rate
mortgage.'22 A brief look at the above factors strongly suggests that at
least one type of "private lender", the seller of property taking back a
purchase money deed of trust, 23 should be allowed automatic enforce-
ment of a due-on-sale clause. 124
2. Non-residential property
The property securing the loan in Wellenkamp was a single family
residence. Considerable debate has taken place regarding the applica-
bility of the holding to other types of property. 25 Outlining the facts of
the case before it, the Wellenkamp court referred only to the "parcel of
real property"1 26 in question. It is thus arguable that the court consid-
ered the classification of property to be irrelevant. 27 Supporting this
reading of the decision is the Wellenkamp court's reliance on Tucker,
which involved commercial property.12
8
However, in setting forth the reason why assumption of the loan at
an increased rate of interest imposes a significant restraint on the seller,
the court engaged in a distinction between residential and commercial
property. The Wellenkamp court reasoned that in the assumption situ-
ation the seller is forced to lower the purchase price and absorb the loss
121. Goodman, supra note 11, at 38-39.
122. Hetland, supra note 11, at 44. Hetland argued that the "private lender" exception
should extend to all lenders subject to California's usury laws, as other alternatives are not
available to such lenders. Thus, Hetland maintained, these lenders should not be subject to
the double burden of unenforceability of the due-on-sale clause and the usury limitations.
123. This is the most noted and common type of "private lender." Other "private lender"
situations exist: a parent lending money to a child to buy real estate might include a due-on-
sale clause to assure that the property remain in the family for a certain length of time. It is
unnecessary to make an exhaustive list of "private lender" situations, however, as the con-
siderations remain the same.
124. But cf Sanders v. Hicks, 317 So. 2d 61 (Miss. 1975) (suggesting that a seller attempt-
ing to foreclose under a purchase money trust deed must nonetheless demonstrate reasona-
bleness).
125. For the purposes of discussion in this Note, non-single family residential property is
referred to as commercial property.
126. 21 Cal. 3d At 946, 582 P.2d at 972, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 381.
127. Hetland, supra note 11, at 41 (arguing that this language represents a deliberate at-
tempt on the part of the court to make the opinion applicable to all types of property).
128. Id. The property in Tucker was a non-owner occupied single rental unit.
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with a resulting reduction in his equity interest.129 The court noted that
this result contravenes state policy embodied in Health and Safety
Code Section 50007 in favor of protecting home equities.130 This policy
is not at issue with investment property.
The court's lack of clarity as to the effect of Wellenkamp on non-
residential property can only inject confusion into the law of real estate
financing. This uncertainty causes disadvantage to the borrower, the
purchaser, and the lender. In Medovoi v. American Savings and Loan
Association,'3' the supreme court was presented with the opportunity
to determine the applicability of the Welenkamp decision to non-resi-
dential property. The court avoided resolution of this issue, however.
Medovoi was appealed at the same time as was Wellenkamp. Rather
than hear Medovoi, the supreme court remanded it to the court of ap-
peal for reconsideration in light of Wellenkamp.
In Medovoi the subject property was a six-unit apartment complex.
The court of appeal, after summarizing the rather complex factual situ-
ation, held that Wellenkamp was inapplicable. 32 In so holding both
the majority and the concurrence sharply criticised the Wellenkamp de-
cision and its rationale. The plaintiff appealed once again to the
supreme court. The court refused to hear the case, and certified it for
non-publication.
It is not clear why the supreme court chose not to hear this case.
There are at least four plausible explanations. First, the court may not
be ready to decide whether or not it should draw a distinction between
residential and non-residential property. Alternatively, the court may
be willing to extend Wellenkamp to commercial property but was un-
willing to do so in Medovoi because the equities were clearly in favor of
the lender. 133 Third, the holding in Medovoi is quite narrow. 134 The
unique fact situation presented in that case will probably never re-oc-
129. 21 Cal. 3d at 950, 582 P.2d at 975, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 384.
130. Id. at 950 n.6, 582 P.2d at 975 n.6, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 384 n.6.
131. 89 Cal. App. 3d 244, 152 Cal. Rptr. 572 (certified for non-publication Apr. 19, 1979).
132. Id. at 258-59, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 581.
133. There was evidence presented that the purchaser, Medovoi, and the second trust
deed holder colluded in order to keep knowledge of the transfer from the lender. Medovoi
fell behind on the mortgage payments, and soon thereafter, he defaulted.
134. Summing up his holding in Medovo, Justice Hanson stated:
Accordingly, we conclude that where, as in the case at bench, there was an involun-
tary transfer of a multi-unit apartment property to a non-assuming transferee, who
took legal title merely for the purpose of sale to a transferee who would assume the
loan, where no notice of the transfer was given and the transferee thereafter re-
fused to assume, a foreclosure thereupon was instituted and the purchaser aban-
doned the property, that Wellenkamp is inapplicable.
89 Cal. App. 3d at 258-59, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 581.
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cur. Accordingly, the supreme court may have decided that review was
not only unnecessary but unwise, because a ruling in Medovoi could
generate even further confusion over the scope of Wellenkamp. Fi-
nally, the supreme court may have agreed with the rationale of the
court of appeal, but determined that publication of the attacks levelled
at the Wellenkamp opinion would not be in the interests of judicial
harmony.
The court could have avoided these problems by hearing Medovoi
with Wellenkamp, rather than remanding it to the court of appeal.
Even had the supreme court held that commercial property is subject to
the Wellenkamp restrictions, the trial court, on rehearing, could have
found that the Medovoi acceleration was reasonable.
When the supreme court finally rules on this question, it must look
beyond the language and rationale of Wellenkamp. Several important
considerations indicate that Wellenkamp should not apply to non-resi-
dential property. Three were discussed by Justice Hanson in his un-
published Medovoi opinion. First, the policy of protecting
homeowner's equity' has no application to non-residential property.
Second, the legislature has repeatedly singled out owner-occupied
homes or dwellings of four units or less for special protection. This
indicates a legiglative determination that special protection is necessary
only for such residential units. Third, the quantum of restraint with
regard to investment property is significantly less. Sellers of commer-
cial real estate are in a better postion to make a decision to sell for
economic rather than personal reasons. They, therefore, can afford to
wait for a favorable lending environment before making a sale.
Further justifying limiting Wellenkamp to residential property, the
court in Wellenkamp strongly attacked the injustice caused by a lender
placing the burden of its mistaken economic projections on innocent
property owners.136 A seller of commercial property is in the business
of making such sales. As such, it is likely that he has just as much
knowledge of current market conditions as does the lender. The argu-
ment that the lender should bear the risks inherent in an inflationary
economy loses some of its force.'37 Also, because the lender and the
borrower have no gross inequality of bargaining position, the deed of
trust is less likely to be a contract of adhesion.13 8
135. See text accompanying notes 129-30 supra.
136. 21 Cal. 3d at 953, 582 P.2d at 976, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
137. Goodman, supra note 11, at 40.
138. See MCA, Inc. v. Universal Diversified Enterprises Corp., 27 Cal. App. 3d 170, 103
Cal. Rptr. 522 (1972) (trust deeds, although standard form contracts, were not contracts of
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Finally, California's anti-deficiency legislation does not apply to
deeds of trust executed to secure non-residential, non-owner occupied
property.13 9 When lending money in a situation in which the lender
might be able to obtain a deficiency judgment against the borrower, the
borrower's credit is crucial. Any transfer by the borrower to someone
who has not been evaluated by the lender creates an automatic impair-
ment of security.
For the foregoing reasons, the California Supreme Court should
limit the application of Wellenkamp to residential property. In any
event, the court should resolve this needless ambiguity in the law.
E. Federal Preemption: Are Federal Savings and Loans Required to
Follow Wellenkamp?
Shortly after Wellenkamp was decided, the United States District
Court for the Central District of California held that the validity of
due-on-sale clauses contained in loan agreements executed by federally
chartered savings and loan associations is governed exclusively by fed-
eral law."4 This applies, at least, to agreements entered into after June
8, 1976.141 Thus federally chartered savings and loans142 may be unaf-
fected by the Wellenkamp decision.
1. When does federal preemption occur?
Federal preemption of state law derives from the supremacy clause
of the United States Constitution. 143 If Congress has legislatively exer-
cised its granted powers, then operation of state law in the same area is
adhesion, as there was no great disparity of bargaining power between borrower and
lender).
139. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580b (West 1976) provides, in pertinent part:
No deficiency judgment shall lie in any event... under a deed of trust, or mort-
gage, on a dwellingfor not more thanfourfamilies given to a lender to secure repay-
ment of a loan which was in fact used to pay all or part of the purchase price of
such dwelling occupied entirely or in part, by the purchaser. (emphasis added).
140. Glendale Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Fox, 459 F. Supp. 903, 904 (C.D. Cal. 1978),
appeal docketed, No. 77-32-74 (9th Cir. Sept. 11, 1979).
141. See notes 154-68 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the applicability of
Wellenkamp to agreements entered into before this date.
142. A federal savings and loan association is one chartered by the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board. 12 C.F.R. § 541.2 (1979). It is identified by the inclusion of the words "Fed-
eral Savings and Loan Association" in its corporate title. See 12 C.F.R. § 543.1(a) (1979).
143. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 provides that "[tihis Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof... shall be the supreme Law of
the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution
or Laws of any State to the Contrary, Notwithstanding."
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suspended. 144
Generally, preemption occurs when there is a specifically applica-
ble federal regulation, or when Congress has indicated an intent to pre-
empt the field. 45 Such intent is manifested when the scheme of federal
regulation is so pervasive that the reasonable inference is that Congress
left no room for state law to supplement it, or if there is federal regula-
tion in the general area and the nature of the field mandates uniform
national rules.1
46
2. Federal preemption and the due-on-sale clause
Congress authorized creation of federally chartered savings and
loan associations in the Home Owners Loan Act of 1933.' 41 The Act
set up an administrative agency, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board
(Bank Board) to prescribe regulations governing the creation and ad-
ministration of these institutions.
In 1976, the Bank Board passed three regulations which address
due-on-sale clauses. 148 Exercise of the clause is permitted, 4 9 unless the
event triggering acceleration falls into one of a limited number of ex-
ceptions.150 Waiving acceleration in return for an assumption of the
144. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 359 (1943).
145. Comment, The Due-On Clause: A Preemption Controversy, 10 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 629,
631 (1977) [hereinafter cited as A Preemption Controversy]. It was concluded that courts will
generally find preemption when either of these two factors is present.
146. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978).
147. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(a) (1976) provides:
In order to provide local mutual thrift institutions in which people may invest their
funds and in order to provide for the financing of homes, the Board [Federal Home
Loan Bank Board] is authorized, under such rules and regulations as it may pre-
scribe, to provide for the organization, incorporation, examination, operation, and
regulation of associations to be known as "Federal Savings and Loan Associa-
tions," and to issue charters therefor, giving primary consideration to the best prac-
tices of local mutual thrift and home financing institutions in the United States.
148. 12 C.F.R. §§ 545.6-11(f) and (g), § 556.9 (1979). These regulations were effective as
of June 8, 1976.
149. 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-11(f) (1979). In pertinent part, this regulation states:
A Federal association continues to have the power to include, as a matter of con-
tract between it and the borrower, a provision in its loan instruments whereby the
association may, at its option, declare immediately due and payable all of the sums
secured by the association's security instrument if all or any part of the real prop-
erty securing the loan is sold or transferred by the borrower without the associa-
tion's prior written consent. Except as provided in paragraph (g) of this section
. . . exercise by an association of such an acceleration option (hereafter called a
due-on-sale clause) shall be governed exclusively by the terms of the contract be-
tween the association and the borrower. ...
150. 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-1l(g)(1) (1979) provides:
With respect to any loan made after July 31, 1976, on the security of a home occu-
pied or to be occupied by the borrower, a Federal association may not exercise a
due-on-sale clause based on any of the following:
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existing loan at an increased rate of interest is expressly sanctioned."15
The Wellenkamp holding is inconsistent with the federal regula-
tions. In Glendale Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Fox,15 2 the
court restated the accepted principle that when there is a specific fed-
eral law covering a subject matter, inconsistent state law must yield.
Therefore, the court held that the federal regulations rather than the
Wellenkamp rule controlled loans made by federal savings and
loans. 153
Fox expressly left open the question of whether state or federal
law governs due-on-sale clauses in loans executed prior to June 8, 1976,
the effective date of the regulations.'54 It is important to address this
question because the Fox preemption ruling has a significantly greater
impact if applied to loans made before the regulations went into effect.
Preemption exists if, in passing the Home Owners Loan Act, Con-
gress intended to preclude the states from legislating with regard to fed-
eral savings and loans. Courts have not agreed as to whether or not
such intention existed. In Meyers v. Beverly Hills Federal Savings and
Loan Association, 5 5 the plaintiff contended that certain prepayment
penalty provisions in deeds of trust executed by federally chartered sav-
ings and loans were void under California law. While basing its dis-
missal of the action on the grounds that there were Bank Board
regulations governing such provisions, the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals suggested in dictum that state law would not apply even absent
these specific federal regulations. 56 At least two other circuits have
(i) Creation of a lien or other encumbrance subordinate to the association's
security instrument;
(ii) Creation of a purchase money security interest for household appliances;
(ill) Transfer by devise, descent, or by operation of law upon the death of a joint
tenant;
(iv) Grant of any leasehold interest of three years or less not containing an option
to purchase.
151. 12 C.F.R. § 556.9(d) (1979) states that "[s]ection 545.6-11(g)(3) of this subchapter
authorizes Federal associations to increase the interest rate as a condition of loan assump-
tion."
152. 459 F. Supp. 903 (C.D. Cal. 1978), appeal docketed, No. 77-32-74 (9th Cir. Sept. 11,
1979).
153. The court stated that "[the regulations on theirface indicate the Bank Board's intent
to exercise the authority to preempt delegated to it by Congress and to govern exclusively
the validity and exercisability of due-on-sale clauses in the lending instruments of federal
associations." Id. at 911 (emphasis added).
154. Id. at 911 n.12.
155. 499 F.2d 1145 (9th Cir. 1974).
156. The court stated that "[plursuant to its valid statutory authority, the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board has promulgated comprehensive regulations covering all aspects of every
federal savings and loan association 'from its cradle to its corporate grave."' Id. at 1146-47
(citations omitted).
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indicated agreement with this position.157 However, in Derenco, Inc. v.
Benjamin Franklin Federal Savings and Loan 4ssociation,158 the Ore-
gon Supreme Court held that in the absence of Bank Board regulations
in the particular area at issue, 159 federally chartered savings and loans
are subject to state law. The court reasoned that the field involving
federal savings and loans is not one requiring uniformity of decision so
as to mandate exclusive use of federal law.' 60  Because the United
States Supreme Court denied certiorari in Derenco, this issue remains
unresolved.'61
The Supreme Court has disfavored applying legislation retroac-
tively, absent express provision or clear implication in a statute or regu-
lation. 162  However, the language in the Bank Board's due-on-sale
regulations strongly suggests an intent to preempt the area. In the pre-
amble to the regulations, the Board maintained that "[ilt was and is the
Board's intent to have. . . due-on-sale practices governed exclusively
by federal law."' 63  The regulation authorizing use of the due-on-sale
provision provides that "[a] Federal Association continues to have the
power to include . . . [an acceleration provision]."' 64 This indicates
157. Kupiec v. Republic Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 512 F.2d 147, 150 (7th Cir. 1975); Cen-
tral Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 422 F.2d 504 (8th Cir. 1970).
158. 281 Or. 533, 577 P.2d 477, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1051 (1978).
159. Derenco concerned an Oregon law allowing borrowers to demand an accounting of
profits allegedly realized on reserve accounts.
160. 281 Or. at 549, 577 P.2d at 487-88.
161. The United States Supreme Court recently decided its first case concerning preemp-
tion with regard to federal savings and loan associations. In Conference of Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'ns v. Stein, 604 F.2d 1256 (9th Cir. 1979), aft'd, 100 S. Ct. 1304 (1980), the Court
summarily affirmed a decision by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals that the power to
regulate federal savings and loans is vested exclusively in the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board. The Ninth Circuit thus held that the Secretary of the Business and Transportation
Agency of California was without authority to enforce California's anti-redlining statutes,
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 35800-35833 (West 1976) against federal savings and
loans. 604 F.2d at 1257. Stein, however, does not answer the question left open in Fox.
The Stein court was careful to draw a distinction between the "substantive" and the "proce-
dural" aspects of the Home Owners Loan Act. Id. at 1260. The court stressed the fact that it
was not deciding whether or not the California anti-redlining statutes themselves were en-
forceable against federal savings and loans. Rather, the court stated, the only issue was "the
regulatory authority of [the Secretary of Business and Transportation] over the federal as-
sociations." Id. The court held that "[i]f state-conferred rights are to be enforced against
the federal associations by any regulatory body, (a question we do not now reach), enforce-
ment must be by the Bank Board." Id. (emphasis added). Because the rights conferred in
Wellenkamp are "substantive" rather than "procedural", and because enforcement of these
rights is entrusted to the courts rather than to a state administrative agency, Stein is not on
point.
162. 4 Preemption Controversy, supra note 145, at 633 n.24.
163. Preamble to Bank Board Resolution No. 76-296, April 28, 1976 (emphasis added).
164. 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-11(f) (1979). See note 149 supra.
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that the right to include such clauses always existed.' 65 Moreover, the
regulations prohibit imposition of prepayment charges upon exercise of
a due-on-sale clause "only with regard to loans made upon borrower-
occupied homes after July 31, 1976." 166 Use of such provisions prior to
that date is left to the lender's discretion. The logical inference is that
as the prepayment charges were valid before July, 1976, and because
they are used in conjunction with the due-on-sale clause, the due-on-
sale clause must also have been acceptable.' 67 Additionally, as there
are varying state interpretations of the due-on-sale clause, deference to
state law on the subject would result in a decisive lack of uniform na-
tional policy.
16
It appears that due-on-sale clauses in agreements executed by fed-
eral savings and loans are governed exclusively by federal law, regard-
less of when the contract was signed. The inconsistency between
federal law and state law regarding due-on sale clauses creates certain
difficulties. It is unfair to permit the validity of a loan provision to
depend upon the source of the lender's charter, 169 rather than on the
nature of the agreement. Moreover, this dichotomy opens up the door
to a flurry of conversions from state to federal charters in order to
avoid the impact of Wellenkamp.'70
In light of the difficulties caused by the application of the preemp-
tion doctrine to due-on-sale clauses, it would be advisable for the Bank
Board to repeal these regulations and provide instead that due-on-sale
provisions in loans executed by federal associations are to be governed
by the law of the state in which the property is located.
F Result of the Wellenkamp Decision: Increased Use of the Variable
Rate Mortgage?
As a result of the Wellenkamp holding, lenders have to utilize
means other than the due-on-sale clause to maintain their loan portfo-
lios at current rates of interest. The variable rate mortgage serves as
165. A Preemption Contreversy, supra note 145, at 632-33.
166. 12 C.F.R. § 556.9(b)(1) (1979).
167. A Preemption Controversy, supra note 145, at 633.
168. Id. at 642-43.
169. Hetland, After Wellenkamp (pt.3), CAL. REAL ESTATE MAGAZINE 16, 18 (Feb. 1979).
Professor Hetland stated that national banks, as opposed to savings and loans, are subject to
state law regarding loans secured by real property. Id. at 17.
170. CAL. FIN. CODE § 9250 (West 1976) permits a state chartered savings and loan asso-
ciation to convert itself into a federal savings and loan if certain procedures, outlined in
§§ 9251-9256, are followed.
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another vehicle to this end.171 According to the Wellenkamp majority,
the variable rate mortgage is an "attractive and viable alternative"'' 7 2 to
the due-on-sale provision.
A variable rate mortgage is a mortgage with an interest rate which
varies according to fluxes in economic conditions. 7 3  Such variation
may effect either an increase or decrease in the interest rate. 74 In the
event of an increase, the borrower generally has the option of extending
the loan for any additional period necessary to amortize the loan, while
continuing at the rate of the existing monthly payments. The variable
rate mortgage was authorized by the California legislature in 1972.17
Its use, however, is subject to very strict limitations.
76
Numerous arguments are advanced in favor of the variable rate
mortgage. Price level fluctuations are difficult if not impossible to pre-
dict over any great length of time. As a result, in a long-term loan, the
borrower benefits at the expense of the lender if levels rise. 177 The re-
verse is not true, however, if levels fall. In this situation, the borrower
171. Other possibilities include graduated payment mortgages, where the ratio of princi-
pal to interest decreases over the life of the loan, and short term (two years or less) fixed
interest loans, where the borrower has the option to renew at the end of the term at the
current rate of interest. Goodman, supra note 11, at 41.
172. 21 Cal. 3d at 952 n.10, 582 P.2d at 976 n.10, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 385 n.10.
173. Spolan, The Casefor Variable Rate Mortgages, I REAL ESTATE REV. No. 2, 15, 15
(1971).
174. Rate adjustment in the variable rate mortgage is tied to current economic conditions.
The rate of any increase or decrease is determined by an index which reflects the cost of
money to the lender at any given time. Comment, Adjiistable Interest Rates in Home Mort-
gages: 4 Reconsideration, 1975 Wis. L. Rav. 742, 761. Many such indices are possible.
Savings and loan associations issuing variable rate mortgages under CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 1916.5 (West Supp. 1978) (see notes 175-76 infra and accompanying text) are required to
use as an index "the last published weighted average cost of savings, borrowings and federal
Home Loan Bank advances to California members of the Federal Home Loan Bank of San
Francisco as computed from statistics tabulated by the Federal Home Loan Bank of San
Francisco." CAL. ADM. CODE, tit. 10 § 240.2(a)(1) (1979).
175. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1916.5 (West Supp. 1978).
176. Section 1916.5(a)(6) requires "a statement attached to the security document and to
any evidence of debt issued in connection therewith printed or written in a size equal to at
least 10-point bold type, consisting of the following language: NOTICE TO THE BOR-
ROWER: THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS PROVISIONS FOR A VARIABLE INTER-
EST RATE." Section 1916.5(a)(2) provides that "[t]he rate of interest shall change not more
often than once during any semiannual period, and at least six months shall elapse between
any two such changes." Section 1916.5(a)(3) provides that "[tihe change in the interest rate
shall not exceed one-fourth of 1 percent in any semiannual period, and shall not result in a
rate more than 2.5 percentage points greater than the rate for the first loan payment due
after the closing of the loan." In addition, section 1916.5(a)(5) requires that "[t]he borrower
[be] permitted'to prepay the loan in whole or in part without aprepayment charge within 90
days of notification of any increase in the rate of interest." (emphasis added).
177. McManus, Variable Mortgage Note: Route to Increased Housing, 55 A.B.A.J. 557,
558 (1969).
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can refinance at the lower rate of interest and pay off the existing
loan. 7  With the variable rate mortgage, the lender is assured that in-
terest will be paid at the current rate 79 and the borrower required to
obtain money during a period of inflation is not locked into paying a
higher rate than one who borrows when economic conditions are more
favorable. 180
It is also argued that variable rates provide even greater protection
to the lender than due-on-sale clauses. Due-on-sale provisions, even if
presumed valid, are only activated in the event of a sale. Variable
rates, however, fluctuate according to changes in economic conditions.
Thus, variable rate mortgages are a desirable method of assuring that
loan portfolios reflect the true cost of borrowing and of facilitating a
steady infusion of new funds into the housing market.' 8 '
Close scrutiny of variable rate mortgages reveals potentially seri-
ous problems in their use as an alternative to due-on-sale clauses. Most
of the arguments advanced in favor of the variable rate mortgage are
the so-called "portfolio" arguments. Yet the Wellenkamp court ex-
pressly stated that such considerations do not justify exercise of the
due-on-sale clause.' Consistency would dictate that economic factors
are either a justifiable purpose behind provisions contained in loan
agreements or they are not. There is no reason for distinguishing be-
tween due-on-sale provisions and variable rate mortgages on this
ground.
After Wellenkamp it is likely that variable rate mortgages will be
included routinely in deeds of trust. Yet surveys indicate that most
178. Id. McManus noted that if rates drop, and the borrower does not choose to refi-
nance, then the debt will be disproportionate to the value of the asset.
179. But query whether this advantage is lessened by provisions, such as section
1916.5(e), which allow the borrower to continue to pay the lower rate by extending the life of
the loan.
180. Note, The Demise of the Due-On-Sale Clause, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 573, 599 (1976).
The author argued that the advantage to the variable rate mortgage is that at any given time,
the interest paid on the loan reflects the current market rate.
181. Comment, The Variable Interest Rate Clause And Its Use In California Real Estate
Transactions, 19 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 468, 473 (1972). The author noted that another disad-
vantage to the fixed long-term loan, at least when the loan is made by a savings and loan
association, is that the fixed return limits the amount that can be paid out to depositors.
Under a variable rate loan, the higher interest payments made by long term borrowers in
times of inflation generate increased funds for depositors. In a period of deflation, the inter-
est payments are less. However, the lender does not suffer, as it does not need to pay as high
an interest rate to attract new savers. Id. at 471.
182. 21 Cal. 3d at 953, 582 P.2d at 976-77, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 385-86.
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prospective homebuyers are opposed to variable mortgages.183 Many
such buyers consider a fixed home mortgage to be advantageous. The
advantage seen in the fixed rate is that in times of inflation payments
remain the same, while during a recession a homeowner is afforded the
opportunity to refinance at a lower rate. 8 4 Opposition to variable
mortgages might stem from a fear that the practical effect of such mort-
gages -will be a continuous rise in rates, insofar as a recession is un-
likely. 85 It is worth noting that these borrower concerns are somewhat
exaggerated, given that variable rate mortgages fluctuate very little.
The California Civil Code prohibits any change in the interest rate
greater than "one-fourth of 1 percent in any semiannual period."'
186
Unless borrowers' attitudes change, however, variable rate mort-
gages are likely to be challenged in court. Will these provisions then be
struck down on either a contract of adhesion theory, or on the basis of
furthering a "public policy" of protecting the consumer against large
institutions? If these challenges are successful, then a decreased flow of
funds will result, causing the mortgage market to dry up.
Apart from these theoretical issues, there are two other difficulties
caused by substituting variable rate mortgages for due-on-sale clauses.
First, variable rates are permitted only for purchase money loans se-
cured by specified residential property. 87 As was indicated earlier,188
it is unclear whether. or not Wellenkamp is so limited. This strongly
suggests that if variable mortgages are to be a workable alternative,
183. For a discussion of one such survey which revealed an 82% opposition rate, see
Kratovil, supra note 3, at 313.
184. Comment, Adjustable Interest Rates in Home Mortgages: A Reconsideration, 1975
Wis. L. REv. 742, 745-47. The author indicated that another factor which causes borrower
opposition is that the increase in land values in times of inflation does not result in realizable
income to the borrower. Thus, the borrower may not be able to meet the higher interest
payments.
185. Kratovil maintained that this fear is well-founded. He reasoned that if two purchas-
ers signed agreements in 1950, one under a fixed rate and one under the VRM, the latter
would be paying 2 times as much interest today. Kratovil, supra note 3, at 313.
186. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1916.5(a)(3) (West Supp. 1978). In addition, the Code provides
that the interest demanded "shall [never] result in a rate more than 2.5 percentage points
greater than the rate for the first loan payment due after the closing of the loan." Id.
187. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1916.5(b) (West Supp. 1978) provides:
The provisions of this section shall be applicable only to a mortgage contract, deed
of trust, real estate sales contract, or any note or negotiable instrument issued in
connection therewith, when its purpose is tofinance the purchase or construction of
realproperty containingfour orfewer residential units or on which four orfewer resi-
dential units are to be constructed.
(emphasis added).
188. See text accompanying notes 125-39 supra.
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then they must be permitted with regard to any property covered by the
Wellenkamp holding.
Second, the variable rate mortgage was impermissible in Califor-
nia prior to 1972. The Wellenkamp holding, however, has a partially
retroactive effect, extending to all due-on-sale clauses not yet en-
forced.' 89 Many mortgage agreements with due-on-sale provisions
were entered into before the authorization of variable rate mortgages.
The effect of the Wellenkamp decision on lenders is alleviated only par-
tially by use of the variable rate mortgage. The court, therefore, should
have considered limiting the retroactivity of Wellenkamp to loans exe-
cuted after 1972.
V. CONCLUSION
Due-on-sale clauses are legitimate means by which lenders are
able to keep loan portfolios at current rates of interest. By an improper
reading of precedent and a misuse of the restraints on alienation the-
ory, the California Supreme Court has attempted to prohibit such use.
Provisions like the due-on-sale clause are always subject to potential
abuse. It has been suggested, however, that such abuses are best cor-
rected on a case by case basis, rather than by the inflexible Wellenkamp
rule.
The impact of Wellenkamp will likely be minimal. Federally
chartered savings and loan associations and non-institutional lenders
appear to be exempt from the decision. Furthermore, Wellenkamp may
be inapplicable to loans securing non-residential real property. Fi-
nally, devices such as the variable rate mortgage provide a different
means for lenders to reach the same end. Should the real estate financ-
ing industry escape unscathed, however, Wellenkamp remains a painful
reminder of the inordinate power lodged in the courts to bend the law
to reach what they determine is a desirable result.
Lynne McGinnis
189. 21 Cal. 3d at 954, 582 P.2d at 977, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 386.
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